It was his wife's HECM, not his, and when she died, ownership of the house reverted to the lender because the husband was not an owner. At the outset of the HECM transaction, he was too young to qualify so he had his name removed from the deed so that his wife could qualify on her own. She could have lived in the house forever, but as a roomer in her house, he had no right to remain.
This is painted as a reverse mortgage horror story, but it is nothing of the sort. HECMs are for owner-occupants, not roomers, which is what the husband had made himself into. The correct moral is that the program should not be misused.
Even less useful are spurious claims that growth of the reverse mortgage market has major similarities to the growth of the subprime market, and could lead to the same kind of "financial fiasco." The major source of this nonsense is an October 2009 monograph by Tara Twomey of the National Consumer Law Center entitled "Subprime Revisited: How Reverse Mortgage Lenders Put Older Homeowners' Equity at Risk."
In fact, the two programs could hardly be more different, and there is no chance of a similar fiasco.
Subprime loans imposed repayment obligations on borrowers, many of whom were woefully unprepared to assume them, and which tended to rise over time. The financial crisis actually began with the increasing inability of subprime borrowers to make their payments, with the result that defaults and foreclosures ballooned to unprecedented heights.
In contrast, reverse mortgage borrowers assume no repayment obligation at all. Their only obligation is to maintain their property and pay their property taxes, which they have to do as owners whether they take out a reverse mortgage or not.
They cannot default on their mortgage because the obligation to make payments under a HECM is the lender's, not the borrower's. There are no reverse mortgage foreclosures.
Subprime foreclosures imposed heavy losses on lenders and on investors in mortgage securities issued against subprime mortgages. Such securities were widely held by investors, which included Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Losses by the agencies on their subprime securities played a major role in their insolvency.
In contrast, no lenders have suffered or will suffer losses on HECMs because they are insured against loss by FHA. FHA assumes the losses when HECM loan balances grow to the point where they exceed property values. However, this is an expected contingency against which FHA maintains a reserve account supported by insurance premiums paid by borrowers.
It is true that the unprecedented decline in property values over the last few years has increased losses and eaten into FHA's reserves. But FHA has responded to that by reducing the percentage of home values that seniors can access. According to a recent study by New View Advisors, who are seasoned experts on HECMs, this should allow FHA to break even over the long run.
In sum, the current state of the HECM market has no resemblance whatsoever to the conditions in the subprime market that led to disaster.
Next week: More bogus arguments against HECMs.
The writer is professor of finance emeritus at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Comments and questions can be left at www.mtgprofessor.com.
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Copyright 2010 Jack Guttentag